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Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) is the process by which data from on-board recorders, or so-called ‘black
boxes’, is analysed after every journey to detect subtle trends which, if allowed to continue, would lead to
an accident. An opportunity has been identiﬁed to advance the state of the art in FDM processes by
coupling recorder data to established Human Factors methodologies so that issues arising from the stra-
tegically important human/machine-system interface can be better understood and diagnosed. The
research has also identiﬁed a signiﬁcantly underused source of recorder-data within the railway industry.
Taking this data, the paper demonstrates how key areas of driver performance can be quantiﬁed using a
simple behavioural cluster detection method coupled to sensitivity and response bias metrics. Faced with
a class of operational accident that is increasingly human-centred, an underused source of data, and
methods that can join it to established human performance concepts, the potential for detecting risks
in advance of an accident are signiﬁcant. This paper sets out to describe and demonstrate this potential.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Data recording
Data recording is the act of automatically logging information
on system parameters over time. Data recording has become
increasingly ubiquitous in rail transport operations. Entire national
train ﬂeets are now required to carry recorders which continuously
extract data on how individual trains are being driven, at increasing
rates, and across an increasing range of parameters. The outﬂow of
data is extensive and growing yet comparatively neglected. What
could it be used for? In this paper we argue it could be used to
tackle the most important strategic risk issues currently faced by
rail operators and authorities worldwide.1.2. Brief history
The act of automatically recording data on system parameters
over time is referred to as ‘data logging’ or ‘data recording’. In
the aviation industry the generic term data logging falls under
the speciﬁc heading of Flight Data Recording, which itself
comprises several individual procedures and devices. The most
prominent of these is what is termed colloquially as the ‘black
box’, which represents the combination of a Flight Data Recorder(FDR) and a Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). Other systems under
the heading of Flight Data Monitoring include various Aircraft
Condition Monitoring Systems (ACMS), such as engine health
monitoring (e.g. the Rolls Royce EHM programme) and the wide
range of parameters available from modern avionics (e.g. ARINC
573) via so-called ‘Quick Access Recorders’ (QARs).
Data recording can trace its origins back to the allied ﬁelds of
metrology, instrumentation, telemetry, predictive maintenance
and condition monitoring. The Wright Brother’s 1903 ‘Wright Flyer
1’, one of the world’s ﬁrst powered aircraft, was equipped with
‘‘instruments to record air velocity, engine revolutions and time while
in the air’’ (Ford, 2012) and herein lie the very early antecedents for
the sophisticated Flight Data Recording and Monitoring that exist
today. The rail sector, however, can lay claim to even earlier and
more sophisticated examples of instrumentation. Stephenson’s
Rocket (1829), for example, had instrumentation for boiler
pressure and water level, and in 1838 the Great Western Railway
in the UK constructed the ﬁrst ‘dynamometer car’, using equip-
ment designed by Charles Babbage to integrate various readings
into an accurate representation of train performance.
The use of data logging as a tool in safety science is a post-war
development. It evolved amid a wider context that included a
marked increase in post-war air travel, the development of new
jet airliners, and accidents in which passenger aircraft ‘crashed
without trace’ leaving investigators perplexed as to the root cause.
Most notable among these were the De Havilland Comet Crashes of
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‘‘anything which provides a record of ﬂight conditions, pilot reactions,
etc. for the few moments preceding the crash is of inestimable value’’
(Warren, 1954). The prototype ‘Flight Memory Unit’ (as the black
box was then referred) was manufactured from early magnetic
audio recording technologies and a primitive crash survivable
enclosure. The device could superimpose signals from some of
the aircraft’s primary controls onto approximately 30 feet of metal
wire at a rate of approximately eight signals per second. The device
was conﬁgured so that the metal wire looped continuously, storing
four hours of voice and data, continually over-writing itself.
In 1958 the UKAir Registration Board became aware of the Flight
Memory Unit and due to the national importance of the jet aviation
industry and the potential safety barrier that the Comet crashes
represented to continued foreign sales, the concept was considered
important enough to warrant further development. A British clock
making company called S. Davall and Sons were able to acquire
production rights and develop the ﬁrst commercial ‘black box’, or
Davall Type 1050 ‘‘Red Egg’’, as it was then called. Improvements
now enabled readings to be captured at a rate of 24 per second,
greater accuracy in the data collected from aircraft instruments
and controls, and the ﬂexibility to record voice, data or both. To
do this, up to 40 miles of stainless steel wire was needed as a
recording medium. An unexplained air crash in Queeensland in
1960 led to the mandatory ﬁtment of cockpit voice recorders like
these in Australia. Regulations also appeared in the United States
as early as 1958, and legislation also followed in 1960 (Morcom,
1970). In Britain, changes were made to the Air Navigation Order
as early as 1960 although a lengthy period of consultation and
evaluation ensued, meaning that it did not become mandatory to
carry a ﬂight data recorder until 1965. With legislation imminent,
however, the supply and ﬁtment of recorders was well underway
prior to this. Indeed, the ﬁrst crash investigation to make substantial
use of the data provided by an FDR occurred in 1965 when a BEA
Vanguard ﬁtted with a Davell Type 1050 ‘red egg’ crashed in poor
weather at London’s Heathrow airport.
Early data recorders were relatively stand-alone devices. The
recorder carried its own sensors and, apart from an electrical
supply, operated relatively independently of the host aircraft
(Campbell, 2007). Calibration proved to be a problem, with the
actual state of the aircraft systems not necessarily being
identical to those indicated by sensors in the recorder, or even
sometimes the same as those displayed to the pilots on their
cockpit displays. This ‘system architecture’ was to change with
the advent of avionics. Avionics is the collective term given to
aircraft electrical systems. The Boeing 787 and Airbus A380 rep-
resent the current state of the art and an expression of what is
sometimes referred to as the ‘electronic aircraft’. Here, air,
mechanical and hydraulically operated systems are replaced by
electrical systems, all of which reside on a communications net-
work that can be interrogated by various aircraft systems,
including ﬂight data recorders. Rather than a stand-alone device,
data recorders are now part of a comprehensive data acquisition
architecture that relies on the integration of data from myriad
sources via a Flight Data Acquisition Unit (FDAU), common com-
munications protocols (ARINC 573, 717 and 767), and the use of
quick access recorders as well as crash survivable ‘black boxes’.
Modern ﬂight data recorders are solid state devices with the
ability to continuously record over 2000 separate parameters
for in excess of 30 days. The separation between a crash
survivable data and voice recorder, mandated by law and used
for accident investigation, and a Quick Access Recorder (QAR),
not mandated but used for operational and safety purposes by
airlines and regulators, occurred in the 1970s. It arose from a
growing recognition that easy access to ﬂight data, both routine
and abnormal, was of value.While the aviation sector has a long history with on-vehicle
data recording devices for the purposes of safety and crash inves-
tigation, these are a muchmore recent innovation in the rail sector.
Experience in the UK is quite typical. Here, ﬁtment has only been
mandatory since 2002 but has been the subject of discussion
within the industry for many years (Uff, 2000), indeed, a Railway
Group Standard (GO/OTS203) was issued in 1993 in recognition
of the fact that the technology existed and was beginning to be
ﬁtted in isolated cases. The situation the industry faced was one
in which costs (in terms of installation and operation) of ﬁtting
data recorders were estimated at £13,000 per unit, with savings
due to investigations and repairs estimated at only £3200. In sim-
ple terms, this required investment of £75 million and would need
to prevent at least two equivalent fatalities each year to show posi-
tive ﬁnancial beneﬁts (Uff, 2000, p. 177). On this basis, widespread
ﬁtment of data recorders could not be justiﬁed. Privatisation of the
rail industry in 1994 and a number of coincident high proﬁle
crashes (Southall in 1997 and Ladbroke Grove in 1999) served to
accelerate the adoption of data recorders. In the Southall Inquiry
report it is noted that ‘‘In my view, the cost-beneﬁt ﬁgures produced
and the conclusions that they suggest amply demonstrate the short-
comings of CBA [Cost Beneﬁt Analysis] as a decision-making tool
[. . .] I believe that the general ﬁtting of data recorders is long overdue
and that this view is shared by the great majority of the industry.’’
(Uff, 2000, p. 178). By 2002, Railway Group Standard GM/RT
2472 made data recorders mandatory in all new UK trains from
07 December 2003 onwards, and required that existing trains be
ﬁtted with them by 31 December 2005.
Modern trains share some conceptual similarities with aircraft
in that they too make extensive use of electrical actuation (the
brakes are ‘electro-pneumatic’ for example), rely on communica-
tions between disparate devices and systems, data buses (i.e. the
Train Data Bus) and various forms of standardised communications
protocol. In other words, they possess a roughly equivalent form of
‘avionics’ and a data bus (or ‘buses’) through which an on-board
recorder can acquire information. There is not the same degree of
conformity as in comparable avionics systems. Critical differences
between the rail and aviation data acquisition architectures are,
ﬁrstly, that the functions of a ‘Flight Data Acquisition Unit’ (FDAU)
are incorporated within the On Train Data Recorder (OTDR) device
itself. Likewise, so are some of the functions of a Quick Access
Recorder (QAR), and as a result the data must be downloaded man-
ually via serial cable, USB or other memory device. At the present
time there is not a standard ‘data frame’ for OTDR data, with each
device manufacturer using a proprietary version and associated
analysis software. At the present time the emphasis is on individ-
ual data download and analysis for the purposes of driver training
and assessment (as per the Southall Inquiry recommendations) or
else incident investigation, rather than large scale data storage and
industry wide analysis of ‘normal’ operations. Some modern rolling
stock is able to wirelessly download diagnostic information for the
purposes of condition monitoring but at the time of writing this is
the exception rather than the rule.
1.3. Pushing the envelope
Regardless of measure, whether it takes into account exposure
by distance or time, the risk to the travelling public and workforce
of using and operating the railway is exceedingly low. In Europe
the probability of a fatality is approximately 0.57 per billion miles
(Evans, 2011), or two fatalities per 100 million person travel hours
(EU, 2003). This ﬁgure arises despite the fact that exposure in time
and distance have increased dramatically in some countries. In the
UK, for example, between 1995 and 2012 the risk exposure by
passenger distance rose by 25 billion kilometres or 58% (DfT,
2011). At the same time estimated mean fatal train accidents per
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(Evans, 2011). Risk exposure is accompanied by an increase in the
overall intensity of operations. The UK railway system currently
supports 1.3 billion passenger journeys (ORR, 2012) with 16% more
trains timetabled in 2013 compared to 1995, most of which are
running at higher passenger occupancy levels. This equates to
296.2 million train miles travelled in 2010/11 (ORR, 2012), all of
which have at one point or another been recorded on an OTDR
device.
The UK rail network is the ﬁfth busiest in the world behind
China (1.86bn journeys), Germany (1.95bn), India (8.03bn) and
Japan (22.67bn). Relative to population size the UK has the third
highest rail usage in the world at approximately 21 journeys per
head of population. The network is currently loaded with 1.5
billion passenger journeys per year, which compares to an
historical peak of 1.43 billion which occurred in 1946. At this time
the network comprised approximately 30,400 route kilometres
compared to a 2013 network of 15,777 route kilometres. To
support even greater numbers of journeys to those achieved in
1946 on a network 48% smaller means, quite simply, that more
trains are using less track at higher speeds, or in other words, the
system is being constantly pushed ‘‘back to the edge of the
performance envelope’’ (Woods and Cook, 2002, p. 141). The ‘per-
formance envelope’ is deﬁned by Rasmussen (1997) as a set of spe-
ciﬁc boundaries within which transport systems reside. There is a
boundary of economic failure: these are the ﬁnancial constraints
on a system that inﬂuence behaviour towards greater cost and
operational efﬁciencies. Then there is a boundary of unacceptable
workload: these are the pressures experienced by people and
equipment in the system as they try to meet economic and ﬁnan-
cial objectives. The boundary of economic failure creates a pressure
towards greater efﬁciency, which works in opposition to a similar
pressure against excessive workload. Because transport systems
involve human as well as technical elements, and because humans
are able to adapt situations to suit their own needs and prefer-
ences, these pressures introduce variations in behaviour (Qureshi,
2007; Clegg, 2000). ‘‘Over a period of time, [human] adaptive behav-
iour causes [the system] to cross the boundary of safe work regulations
and leads to a systematic migration toward the boundary of function-
ally acceptable behaviour. This may lead to an accident if control is lost
at the boundary’’ (Qureshi, 2007, p. 6). Systems that exist at these
‘limits of controllability’ represent a signiﬁcant challenge for the
human operators within them (Lupu et al., 2013).
1.4. The black box paradox
There are three key paradoxes inherent in this wider picture.
Firstly, because so few major rail accidents occur there is no longer
enough data to construct reliable forward looking estimates (e.g.
Evans, 2011). When safety performance data reaches the level of
that achieved in the rail sector it instead starts to become charac-
terised by unpredictable periodicities, cycles or discrete events.
This is becoming evident in EU rail safety data, with one large scale
rail accident occurring on average every six years (EU, 2003). In
other words, the safety data is ‘levelling off’ with a persistent class
of human/machine-systems accident now elevated to the status of
a key strategic risk (RSSB, 2009).
Secondly, ‘‘there is widespread concern within the industry that
the background indicators – rather than the headline grabbing ones
– have remained worryingly stable’’ (Wolmar, 2012). An example
of this is UK data on Signals Passed At Danger (SPAD) incidents.
In the period since the introduction of a countermeasure called
the Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS), after which
there were initial improvements, there has been comparatively
little variation in the overall SPAD rate. For example, the rate for
Quarter 4 2012 is the same as Quarter 3, and indeed the same(or very nearly the same) as on seven previous reporting periods
since 2005 (e.g. ORR, 2012).
Thirdly, and most paradoxically, is that the opportunities to
use black box data for their original purpose (i.e. post-accident
analysis) are diminishing at the same time as the technical
capabilities of data recorders are increasing. What this means is
that enormous quantities of non-accident data is being collected
day in and day out, but not currently used.
1.5. Flight (rail) data monitoring
This paper is premised on best-practice safety science
approaches developed within the aviation domain, speciﬁcally a
process called Flight Data Monitoring (FDM). This is a ‘‘a systematic
method of accessing, analysing, and acting upon information obtained
from digital ﬂight data records of routine ﬂight operations to improve
safety. It is the pro-active and timely use of ﬂight data to identify and
address operational risks before they can lead to incidents and acci-
dents.’’ (CAA, 2003). FDM is mandatory for operators of aeroplanes
of a certiﬁed take-off mass in excess of 27,000 kg. In effect, it is a
way of using data collected from routine operations to detect
trends which, if allowed to continue, might eventually lead to an
accident. Changes are made to address issues, and the changes
themselves are monitored for their possible effects on other parts
of the system. The traditional approach to FDM is focused on
exceedance or event detection. Events are deﬁned as: ‘‘deviations
from ﬂight manual limits, standard operating procedures and good
airmanship’’ (CAP 739, p16). Computer software is used to auto-
matically scan FDR data for instances of these deviations, and a
set of core events that cover the main areas of interest are quite
standard across operators. Event detection is commonly based on
simple statistical techniques and automatic algorithms that detect
different phases of ﬂight and events therein. FDM is a highly
successful way of making use of black-box data in a pro-active
manner, but it too is challenged by the emerging class of human-
systems problem that is the focus of this paper. Indeed, while hav-
ing systems that automatically detect events, it is still incumbent
on so-called FDM analysts to manually interpret the lower-order
‘trace plots’ that data recorders produce in order to derive meaning
from them. As such, there is considerable value in being able to
robustly transform these trace plots into higher order representa-
tions, to detect psychologically meaningful patterns therein, and
to automatically derive human performance metrics that can help
to assess risk.
1.6. Human Factors leading indicators
Leading indicators are measurable precursors to major events
such as an accident (Reiman and Pietikainen, 2012). The indication
of a precursor ‘leads’, or comes before, the actual event itself. Lag-
ging indicators are the opposite. These are so called ‘loss metrics’
that can only become apparent after an event (Rogers et al.,
2009). Leading indicators are said to be ‘proactive’ because they
enable steps to be taken to avoid seriously adverse consequences.
Lagging indicators are said to be ‘reactive’ in that a seriously
adverse event needs to occur before it can be learnt from (Hinze
et al., 2013). For this reason, leading indicators are also sometimes
referred to as ‘positive performance indicators’ and lagging
indicators as ‘negative performance indicators’. The concept of
leading and lagging indicators originally derives from the ﬁeld of
economics and the need to understand ‘business cycles’ (i.e.
growth, recession, investment, divestiture, etc.) and to predict
when one phase of a ‘cyclical process’ such as this will change to
another (Mitchell and Burns, 1938). The terms have been appropri-
ated more recently by the safety science community (e.g.
Grabowski et al., 2007; Hinze et al., 2013; Reiman and
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Management Systems (SMS) since the 1990s. Leading indicators,
in a Safety Management context, can be deﬁned as ‘‘something that
provides information that helps the user respond to changing circum-
stances and take actions to achieve desired outcomes or avoid
unwanted outcomes’’ (Step Change, 2003, p. 3).
The basic ‘research problem’ can be stated thus: despite
considerable improvements in safety performance in both rail
and aviation sectors, a persistent class of accident/near accident
continues to occur. This class of accident/near accident resides at
the interface of people and machine-systems. What is required is
a means to detect the presence/emergence of such problems before
they manifest themselves as a serious operational incident. This
paper describes how black box data can be coupled to existing
Human Factors methods to provide leading indicators of trends
residing at this interface. Speciﬁcally, it examines OTDR data on
driver responses to an in-cab warning to reveal the types of errors
that may be more likely to arise if the discovered trends continue.2. Method
2.1. Data ﬁle and parameters
The OTDR data ﬁle is a continuous download for a single trac-
tion unit. The recording started at 05:34:57 on the 6th July 2012
and ceased at 21:36.32 on the 11th July 2012. This is a period of
136 h, 1 min and 35 s during which the train made 107 journeys
and travelled 1638 miles. The raw data takes the form of a
Comma Separated (CSV) ﬁle containing a data matrix 191,021 time
samples (rows) deep by 72 parameters (columns) wide: a total of
13,753,512 data points. The mean sampling rate is 2.56 s. The log-
ger itself scans the parameters for changes at a rate of 20 mS but, in
the present system, to economise on memory requirements data
are only logged when one of the 72 parameters changes. The OTDR
device itself was a UK Railway Group Standards compliant
Arrowvale unit which recorded 72 parameters, 25 of which are in
addition to those mandated. In terms of data classiﬁcation four of
the parameters; time, distance and two speed signals derived from
a driven and non-driven axle, are continuous ratio data. The
remaining 68 are nominal/binomial (i.e. on or off).
2.2. Rolling stock
The sample of OTDR data was obtained from a Class 153 ‘super
sprinter’, unit number 153,306. This is a single-unit diesel powered
railcar built between 1987 and 1988. Class 153s are 23.2 m in length
and have an un-laden weight of 41.2 tons. They seat 72 passengers,
comprise a riveted aluminium body shell afﬁxed to a steel under-
frame, and are equipped with four electrically powered single-leaf
Bode doors. The prime-mover is an under-slung turbocharged 6
cylinder Cummins NT855 diesel engine producing 285 bhp. A Cum-
mins-Voith T211r hydraulic transmission drives both axles of the
leading BT38 bogie via a Gmeinder ﬁnal drive. The Unit’s maximum
operating speed is 75 mph. It is ﬁtted with electro-pneumatic clasp
brakes, with cast iron brake pads acting directly on the tread of the
wheel(s) via compressed air actuation. Air suspension is provided
for additional passenger comfort and reﬁnement. Tight-lock com-
pact BSI auto-couplers mean that Class 153’s can work ﬂexibly in
unisonwith several otherDMUclasses. Thepresentunitworkedsolo
for the duration of the data collection period.
2.3. Journeys and routes
Data collection took place on the Great Eastern (Route 7) and
West Anglia (Route 5) regions of the UK’s rail network. Thestrategic ‘backbone’ of the Great Eastern region is the Great Eastern
Main Line (GMEL) originating from London Liverpool Street and
travelling North East to Norwich. There are numerous branch lines
attached to the GMEL providing services to commuter areas and
freight hubs. Data for the present analysis was derived from three
journeys between the towns of Ipswich and Felixstowe, a distance
of 25 km, over which there are 14 AWS sites.
2.4. Automatic Warning System
The purpose of the Automatic Warning System (AWS) is
described thus (McLeod, Walker & Moray, 2005):
‘‘AWS serves two functions. The ﬁrst function is to provide an
audible alert to direct the driver’s attention to an imminent event
(such as a signal or a sign). The second function, linked to the ﬁrst,
is to provide an on-going visual reminder to the driver about the
last warning. [AWS] is there to help provide advance notice about
the nature of the route ahead, and thus communicate to the driver
the need to slow down or stop’’ (p.4).
AWS alerts and reminders are triggered by an electro-magnetic
device placed between the tracks approximately 200 yards prior to
the signal, sign or other event to which it refers (although this
distance can vary according to local circumstances). Sensors under-
neath the train detect the presence of magnetic ﬁelds and activate
AWS accordingly. AWS has three system states:
State 1 – no additional action required
If the event to which an AWS activation is caused requires no
action by the driver (such as a signal showing a green aspect) then
a bell or simulated chime (at 1200 Hz) will sound brieﬂy. The
visual display will also remain inactivated. The driver behaviour
in this case is to proceed; there is no requirement to cancel AWS
using the cancellation button nor is there any speciﬁc need to enact
driving behaviours in addition to those that are current or planned.
State 2 – attention is required towards some imminent signal,
sign or event
If the event to which an AWS activation is caused requires (or
potentially requires) the driver to slow down or stop then a steady
alarm or horn sound (at 800 Hz) will sound. The visual display will
activate (turning from an all-black display to yellow and black,
known as the ‘sunﬂower’).
State 3 – acknowledge (and continue to be reminded of) the
imminent or previous signal, sign or event
The act of cancelling AWS (by pressing a button) stops the horn
sound, and the sunﬂower continues to be displayed. Failure to can-
cel AWS within approximately 2 s leads to an immediate emer-
gency brake application which cannot be cancelled (Railway
Safety, 2001). This level of braking may cause some discomfort to
passengers and the event will be logged on the OTMR equipment.
Repeated failure to cancel the AWS within the time allowed is
likely to lead to an investigation followed by some remedial train-
ing and coaching of the driver.
AWS is a legacy system that was originally conceived as a
means to prevent Signals Passed At Danger (SPADs). Several major
accidents saw the use of AWS, and the number of events it now
refers to, being extended. AWS now provides warnings in six
circumstances:
1. (Certain types of) permanent speed restriction,
2. all temporary speed restrictions,
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4. SPAD indicators,
5. cancelling boards,
6. and other locations (such as unsuppressed track magnets, and
depot test magnets).
Unfortunately, the simple two state warning (bell/horn) and
reminder (black/yellow) is unable to discriminate between these
six different events. There are approximately 29,000 AWS sites
around the UK railway network, which equates to a mean of 1.6
AWS indications received in the train cab every 1.6 route miles,
or 2.7 activations (either a bell or horn sound) every minute when
travelling at 100 mph. Many warning indications require no action
from the driver, simply a press of the cancellation button. Many
other warnings occur in situations when the correct behaviour at
that time is to accelerate the train (it is moving at slow speed or
departing from a station, for example). The task of the driver,
therefore, is not a simple one of hearing the warning and pressing
a button. It requires them to interpret the source of the warning
and the context in which it is occurring, and then decide on the
correct course of action. The confusion that this could cause for
drivers has been cited in several accident inquiry reports (e.g.
Cullen, 2001).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Behavioural clusters
Process charting techniques are used to represent complex real-
world activity in an easy to read graphical format using standard-
ised symbols and layout. The process chart methodology has a long
application history, with early examples dating from the 1920s
(e.g. Gilbreth and Gilbreth, 1921). It has been used extensively in
military and high hazard domains as a way of understanding the
interaction between people and systems, particularly in terms of
identifying human error potential. The method has been used in
both rail and aviation settings before. In this application, process
charts offer a novel way of converting raw ‘trace plots’ derived
from data recorders into an alternative representation, one that
makes it easier to:
 Discern how larger journey phases break down into smaller
component activities.
 The order and timing that component activities occur.
 Who is performing what activity.
 The presence of distinct activity clusters.
The 72 parameters extracted from the data recorder were clas-
siﬁed into:Operator decision (e.g. proceed on basis of
received information?)Operator action (e.g. move control)Information transmitted (e.g. to another part of
the system via a communications medium)Information received (e.g. from system interface
or other agent/actor)Automatic action (e.g. an action performed
autonomously by the system)Once classiﬁed the process chart itself was constructed. This
involved creating a timeline and columns for each ‘agent’ in thesystem. In the case of the railway example six such agents/columns
have been used (Fig. 1). As different recorder channels become
active, the corresponding process chart symbol is inserted into
the relevant column at the correct point on the timeline. The
sequence of activities and their dependence on each other deﬁnes
when these symbols are linked. Thus an activity/symbol that
occurs after another activity/symbol becomes linked ‘vertically’.
Activities that are performed concurrently are linked ‘horizontally’.
Fig. 1 shows the ’normative’ structure of operations associated
with receiving and cancelling an Automatic Warning System alert.
Having the ability to detect behavioural clusters grants the
opportunity to assess whether such structures are typical or
atypical. Indeed, whether they are one of a number of different
behavioural responses within a wider repertoire, and whether
one cluster of behaviour is implicated in risk outcomes more than
another, and under what circumstances. From the collected data
three different ‘clusters’ were detected. The ﬁrst cluster is the nor-
mative ‘perceive-decide-act’ sequence. Here the infrastructure on
the track triggers an in-cab warning horn. The driver perceives
(hears) this, has enough time to classify it (0.89 s) and respond
by pressing the cancellation button. The second cluster is the ‘pre-
dictive cancel’ sequence. In this case the infrastructure on track
triggers the in-cab warning horn but the driver responds so quickly
that it is not possible to have perceived, classiﬁed and responded to
the warning. Instead, the driver has seen the track infrastructure
and has anticipated the in-cab warning and timed their response
to coincide with it starting. The third cluster is the ‘multiple predic-
tive cancel’ sequence. As in cluster two, the driver can see the track
infrastructure ahead and is pressing the cancellation button
numerous times before hearing the in-cab warning horn, and sev-
eral times after the warning has sounded and been cancelled (see
Fig. 2).
3.2. Response bias
Based on the analysis above it is clear, ﬁrstly, that cancelling an
AWS warning is not merely a perceptual one of hearing and seeing
the different system alerts and indications, it is also cognitive: dri-
ver’s not only have to discriminate a ‘stimulus’ from within a
‘noisy’ environment, but correctly classify it and respond. Secondly,
there are different strategies that drivers employ to perform this
apparently simple task. Signal Detection Theory (SDT) helps to
untangle these different aspects by separating out a person’s sensi-
tivity to stimuli (how easy it is to detect something) and their
response bias (their preference for responding one way or another
to the stimuli). SDT helps us to understand why a particular ‘stim-
ulus’, which might be very loud, visible or unambiguous, is not
always responded to in the ways we expect (or vice versa). Signal
Detection Theory classiﬁes human responses to stimuli in the envi-
ronment in four ways. The responses that drivers made within
each of these categories are shown in Table 1.
The ability to accurately detect stimuli in the environment and
correctly classify them is the desired outcome. Under the Signal
Detection Theory (SDT) paradigm this requires a high number of
hits and a low number of false alarms. For example, if the reset but-
ton was pressed in response to ANY warning indication this will
ensure a 100% Hit rate but will also increase the rate of False
Alarms. Accuracy in this case is low. If, on the other hand, the dri-
ver is trying to do the opposite, to avoid False Alarms and instead
maximise Correct Rejections, they would not respond to
ambiguous ‘signals’, they would instead ‘play it safe’. This would
increase the number of Correct Rejections but it would also
increase the number of ‘Misses’. Accuracy in this case is also low.
Signal Detection Theory enables us to separate sensitivity (d0) from
decision bias (C). Sensitivity is a measure of accuracy and tells us
how easy it is to distinguish a particular environmental stimuli
Fig. 1. Annotated process chart showing the type and sequence of operations required to correctly respond to an AWS warning.
Respond to AWS Warning 
SpeedExternal Env.Signalling /TrackTrainPassengerGuardDriver
Respond to AWS Warning 
SpeedExternal Env.Signalling /TrackTrainPassengerGuardDriver
Respond to AWS Warning 
SpeedExternal Env.Signalling /TrackTrainPassengerGuardDriver
Behavioural Cluster Type 1:
The Perceive, Decide, Act Sequence
Behavioural Cluster Type 2:
The Predictive Cancel Sequence
Behavioural Cluster Type 3:
The Multiple Predictive Cancels Sequence
Fig. 2. Three clusters of behaviour associated with cancelling an Automatic Warning System (AWS) alert were detected.
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response is more probable than another.
Human responses to certain stimuli vary because of incentives
embodied in the environment. In train driving, for example, there
is a strong incentive in normal operations to prevent unnecessary
applications of the emergency brake because an AWS warningwas missed. This is because an unwanted brake application cannot
be cancelled and is highly inconvenient. On the other hand, the
consequences of False Alarms are low because nothing happens
when the cancellation button is pressed in error. Because of this
it would be expected that train drivers might adopt a ‘liberal’
decision bias and be willing to prioritise False Alarms (redundant
Table 1
Driver responses to the Automatic Warning System (AWS) can be characterised
according to the Signal Detection Theory (SDT) paradigm as follows.
Status of AWS/TPWS system Categorisation Number %
AWS horn followed by reset Hit 21 30
AWS horn followed by no response Miss 0 0
AWS bell followed by reset or no activation
followed by reset
False alarm 22 31
AWS bell followed by no response Correct
rejection
28 39
Totals 71 100
Table 2
Driver’s sensitivity to the Automatic Warning System (AWS) alerts.
Journey Hits Misses Correct rejections False alarms d-Prime
1 5 0 11 0 4.65
2 9 0 6 7 2.30
3 7 0 11 15 2.13
Mean 3.03
Table 3
Results of decision bias (c).
Journey Hits Misses Correct rejections False alarms Criterion
1 5 0 11 0 0
2 9 0 6 7 1.21
3 7 0 11 15 1.26
Mean 1.24
G. Walker, A. Strathie / Safety Science 74 (2015) 93–101 99presses of the cancellation button) over Correct Rejections (not
pressing the cancel button unnecessarily). Added to this is the dis-
criminability of the ‘stimulus’ people are responding to, a stimulus
that occurs in a ‘noisy’ real-world environment. By noise we refer
to other stimuli, competing demands and distractions in the envi-
ronment as well as the background noise inherent in human
perceptual and cognitive processes. Decision bias and sensitivity
interact with these ‘noisy’ transport environments to make some
future responses more likely than others, in ways that are notFig. 3. Cumulative probability plot showing the extent andalways immediately apparent. For example, highly visible warn-
ings that are apparently ‘missed’, or control actions that are at odds
with the situation.
3.2.1. Sensitivity
Sensitivity to a stimulus is given by the metric d-prime, which
was calculated as follows:
d0 ¼ zðFAÞ  zðHÞ
where z(H) is the number of Hits expressed as a z-value subtracted
from the same Z-transformed False Alarm rate. The results obtained
are shown in Table 2:
The d-prime ﬁgure measures the strength of the stimulus,
which in this case is an AWS warning. A value of 3.03 indicates that
drivers are highly sensitive to it: in this situation it is unambiguous
and easy to discriminate from the wider background of noise, dis-
tractions, other contextual factors, etc. Expressed more formally,
the responses drivers’ are providing when an AWS warning is over-
lain on top of the ‘contextual noise’ is 3.03 standard deviations
‘different’ from the responses they give when the signal is absent
(and only the ‘contextual noise’ is present). Sensitivity provides
an important leading indicator concerning the discriminability of
information needed for driver’s to develop accurate situational
awareness. The same ‘stimuli’ may yield different levels of sensitiv-
ity depending on external/contextual factors. A warning that was
not expected, ambiguous, not fully understood or masked may
lower sensitivity.
3.2.2. Decision criterion
Decision bias/criterion is given by the metric c, which was cal-
culated as follows:
c ¼  ZðHÞ þ ZðFAÞ
2
The results obtained are shown in Table 3:
Decision Bias is independent of sensitivity and relates not to the
discriminability of the ‘signal’ but to the payoffs involved in
making one response in favour of another. Thus, regardless of
how easy it is to discriminate a stimulus a counter intuitivedirection of response biases exhibited by the drivers.
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False Alarms, Misses and Correct Rejections vary with the context.
Psychological research shows that decision bias is more unstable
and situationally dependent than sensitivity and, therefore, a
potentially valuable Leading Indicator.
The mean decision bias value across the three sampled driv-
ers was c = 1.24 which indicates a liberal bias. Driver’s make
more responses that indicate the AWS signal is present than it
is absent. In other words, they are prioritising False Alarms over
Correct Rejections which, in turn, provides a clue as to the sorts
of error that may be more likely to occur in future (i.e. warnings
that are cancelled incorrectly). Assuming that drivers’ ‘internal
responses’ to the AWS warning are normally distributed (as
per Signal Detection Theory) it is possible to plot individual dri-
ver decision bias’ into the chart below which provides an impor-
tant diagnostic tool in deﬁning risky psychological/decision
making states:
According to Fig. 3, Driver 1 shows no systematic bias in their
responses to the AWS warning. They respond correctly to the
AWS warning on every occasion and his/her False Alarm rate is
zero. Drivers 2 and 3 are different. They are exhibiting a strong
‘liberal response bias’ meaning that they are much more inclined
to exhibit ‘false alarm’ responses (and behavioural clusters 2 and
3). With the ability to detect these changes in decision bias
comes the possibility to analyse (a) the extent to which different
biases interact with accident/incident rates (i.e. is a liberal bias of
this magnitude associated with particular types of risk) and (b)
how the context inﬂuences human decision making (and
therefore how that context can be modiﬁed to ‘un-bias’ human
responses).4. Conclusions
This paper has described how the outputs from transport data
recorders can be coupled to existing Human Factors methods to
provide advanced indication of strategically important Human Fac-
tors risks. The ‘black box paradox’ is that the opportunities to use
these devices for their original post-accident purpose are diminish-
ing at the same time as their technical capability and data richness
are increasing. In addition, the types of risks are changing, with
progress in technical areas of reliability and performance exposing
issues around human–machine system interaction. To continue to
ensure safety in the face of increased risk exposure and operational
intensity, better use of this data needs to be made. This paper
demonstrates how black box data from the rail sector can be
turned into useful ‘information’ in the form of Human Factors lead-
ing indicators of risks associated with the use of an in-cab warning
device. Sensitivity provides a measure of how much useful infor-
mation there is in the environment and the extent to which drivers
can discriminate it from the background of contextual noise. Warn-
ings, stimuli and so forth may, in an engineering sense, appear to
be unambiguous, yet they may be considerably less so cognitively.
Sensitivity provides a measure of this which can, in turn, be asso-
ciated with changing risk. Decision bias reveals the likelihood that
one type of driver response will be favoured and how this interacts
with risk. In a wider application it would be possible to examine
decision bias in a systematic way looking at differences between
drivers and between particular routes. This could provide insight
into driving styles and indicate whether particular aspects of a
route result in a shift in decision bias. For example, a speciﬁc
AWS signal on a particular route may result in a high level of
predictive pressing (high false alarms) relative to most others,
identifying this as a more risky section of journey. Relationships
such as these would need to be established based on large-scalefuture research but even on a smaller sample of data the method
was able to detect potentially important differences between driv-
ers, with some adopting a much more liberal response bias than
others. The principle, however, is a much more important one.
We have demonstrated that Human Factors methods like these
can accept recorder data as an input, are amenable to the kind of
software implementation that would be required in a full-scale
application, and point the way towards Leading Indicators of
strategic importance in safety science more generally.Acknowledgements
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